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The transformation of Eastern Europe from centrally planned to market econo- 
mies provides an unprecedented challenge for policymakers in these countries 
as well as for the international community involved in financing and monitor- 
ing their economic programs. It also poses an unusual challenge for the eco- 
nomics profession because there is little prior experience on which to draw for 
lessons that could be applied to the present context.' 
According to the customary classification, the East European countries be- 
long to the group of  middle-income countries. Their relative income levels 
(with suitable correction of relative prices), past growth rates, levels of educa- 
tion, and health all put them in this class. Their political and economic crisis 
came in the wake of increasing maladjustment of the whole ex-Soviet bloc to 
the changing world growth and trade environment. In that superficial respect, 
the adjustment and structural reform problems of Eastern Europe would seem 
to be akin to those of other middle-income countries, such as Brazil, Mexico, 
or Israel; these countries had enjoyed long periods of growth and relative price 
stability in the past, but in the course of the 1970s and 1980s they underwent 
severe structural crises that were either exacerbated or caused by poor response 
to external shocks such as the oil and debt crises. The delayed effects of some 
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1. Hungary started its reform process at an earlier stage, and some of the lessons from this 
experience are of considerable importance. However, the scope of the reform in the other four 
countries and the speed with which it was initiated have no precedent in a command economy. 
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of these same shocks (e.g., energy and raw material prices) are only now being 
felt in Eastern Europe. The difference, however, is not only one of timing or 
of degree. Here, it is the whole political and economic framework that has 
collapsed. Far-reaching political reform was followed by the adoption of an 
economic reform the desired end product of which was similar to that of other 
middle-income countries, but the distance between the initial point and the 
desired goal is not only wider but also substantially deeper. 
The present discussion is confined mainly to the lessons that can be learned 
from the aftermath of stabilization and price reform programs adopted in five 
East European countries-Hungary,  Poland, the Czech and Slovak Republics, 
Bulgaria, and Romania-in  1990 and 1991. By this stage, some institutional 
reforms had already begun to take effect, such as the breakup of the monobank 
into  separate  central  bank  and  commercial  banking  systems.  Privatization, 
however, was only in the early legislation stage. 
How similar are the aims of  the reform in Eastern Europe to other recent 
efforts? One similarity is the attempt to reform and adapt the economic struc- 
ture for integration into the world economy, which involves opening up the 
economy and moving from a completely controlled and distorted set of relative 
prices to relative world prices (for tradable goods). Another similar aim is mac- 
roeconomic stabilization, which has to do with the price level as well as inter- 
nal and external balances. Stabilization, in turn, implies the elimination of high 
inflation or hyperinflation, which either already exists or is repressed (by open 
budget deficits, or soft budget constraints, or monetary overhang) and is bound 
to erupt once prices are decontrolled. Thus far, the objectives (and even the 
means of attaining them) are quite similar to those in other reforms (consider, 
e.g.,  the recent  Mexican  reform  comprising  simultaneous stabilization  and 
opening up). 
The chief  novelty in  the  East  European experience is the revolutionary 
change that is required in the institutional infrastructure-the  financial system 
(such as the breakup of a monobank system), the fiscal,structure, social safety 
nets, the establishment of private property rights, and the mass privatization 
effort. One could easily point to many noncentrally planned economies that 
have either soft budget constraints, a financially repressed business sector, or 
highly subsidized state enterprises, or some combination of all three. However, 
their underlying structure is nonetheless market oriented, and private property 
rights are reasonably well defined. Although  a lot can be learned from the 
reforms that have been applied to the distorted subsystems in these other coun- 
tries, there is a sea of difference between them and those countries where the 
whole economy is one centrally controlled, nonmarket, publicly owned and 
financed system, with no other normative internal reference point, and a market 
economy has  to be  created where none had existed before.  These circum- 
stances have dictated a more comprehensive approach to the reform process 
than has ever been adopted to date. 
All the reform plans, which were part of International Monetary Fund (IMF) 21  Stabilization and Reform in Eastern Europe: A Preliminary Evaluation 
programs, recognized that a simultaneous assault on macroeconomic stabiliza- 
tion, prices, and property rights  was necessary from the inception  stage of 
these programs.2 The programs  have been  largely  “heterodox”  in their ap- 
proach to price stabilization, although they have differed from their predeces- 
sors (e.g., Israel and Mexico) in several respects, such as the way  in which 
wages were controlled. But the programs have been much more far reaching 
and ambitious in their attempt to move at great speed from the initial produc- 
tion equilibrium of the old system to the desired new market-based structure. 
The initial  stabilization  results  have been  impressive by  and large, even 
though the initial price shock in all countries was larger than expected, leading, 
in  most  cases,  to persistent  inflation.  Likewise,  the  observed  balance-of- 
payments improvements may in some cases turn out to be transitory. The main 
surprise for policymakers, and the major departure from the IMF’s initial fore- 
casts, was the speed with which the old productive system responded to the 
new price and incentive signals. The collapse of the Council for Mutual Eco- 
nomic Assistance (CMEA), which, in a sense, was an exogenous event from 
the point of view of  each country, had disastrous consequences on output in 
almost all countries; but this is probably not the whole story. While a private, 
small enterprise sector was developing, both demand and supply factors played 
a much larger than expected role in sharply contracting the output of the large 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Although  some of this contraction may  be 
endemic to the process of stabilization, in virtually all cases the more problem- 
atic issues were the slow tempo of structural adjustment and the sluggishness 
of the privatization effort. 
Although this paper addresses issues common to all the countries involved, 
one should not ignore differences in performance,  some of which originate 
from the considerable diversity in initial conditions that the countries faced at 
the start of the present reform process. Section 1.1 begins with a brief survey 
of  these initial conditions as well as a general outline of the IMF-supported 
 program^.^  Section  1.2 follows with a general discussion of the concept of 
economic reform, based on previous experience with relative speeds of adjust- 
ment in different markets and spheres of economic behavior. A distinction is 
drawn  between  stabilization  of  prices  and  exchange  rates,  which  can  be 
achieved fairly rapidly, and the responses of production structure, investment, 
and ownership patterns to sharp changes in relative prices, all of which tend to 
be extremely slow. Market failure may indeed persist for a long time, which 
2. It is important to point out that, unlike many past cases, IMF programs in East European 
economies thus far have typically been self-imposed, drastic adjustment programs, to which the 
IMF has given its blessing rather than having been the primary initiator. (For comparative details 
of IMF programs in Eastern Europe, see table 1.2 below). 
3. A more detailed discussion of developments in each country can be found in individual coun- 
try surveys published by  the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
and the IMF (Demekas and Khan  1991; and Aghevli, Borensztein, and van der Willigen 1992). 
See also the papers by Dervig and Condon (on Hungary), Berg and Blanchard (on Poland), and 
Dyba and Svejnar (on Czechoslovakia) in this volume. 22  Michael Bruno 
raises the vexing issues of sequencing and the need for, or extent of, residual 
government involvement in the transition stage. 
Price overshooting and the output collapse, and their relation to the choice 
of policies, are taken up in sections 1.3 and 1.4, respectively. Section 1.5 dis- 
cusses the fiscal balance and, in particular, its sustainability in view of  the 
inevitable erosion of the state enterprise tax base and persistent pressures for 
additional social expenditures (replacing the old subsidies). Section 1.6 ad- 
dresses the problems of  financial reform, bad loan portfolios, interenterprise 
credit arrears, and the need for a major cleanup and capitalization of the weak 
commercial banking sector. Section 1.7 raises the question of interim produc- 
tion, trade, and financial regimes for the state enterprise sector during the un- 
certain ownership and control period. Section 1.8 offers concluding remarks. 
1.1  Initial Conditions and Country Programs 
Although almost all the countries in question had embarked on partial struc- 
tural reform in the 1960s, only in Hungary did these reforms not subsequently 
grind to a halt. Although the reform process in Hungary was gradual and beset 
by many setbacks, it persisted over a period of twenty years, and, even though 
the  objective of  that  reform  was  not  a  market-based  economy, Hungary 
emerged better prepared on the institutional economic front than the other 
countries for the dramatic political liberalizations of  1989-90.  Reforms had 
already led to price and trade liberalizations4  and developments in the small- 
scale private ownership sector, and Hungary had also introduced a two-tier 
banking system, a tax reform, and a corporate law before 1989. 
In Poland, which has always had a private agricultural se~tor,~  there were 
also some private-sector developments prior to 1989. Both countries, however, 
suffered from an initial external debt overhang (see table 1.1, which details 
initial preprogram conditions), and both showed practically no growth in the 
1980s. Unlike Hungary, Poland’s imbalance prior to  1989 was also internal, 
the result of a large monetary overhang that the partial price liberalizations and 
ensuing hyperinflation of  1989 helped eliminate, or at least reduce substan- 
tially, before the January 1990 program. 
In the absence of an explicit measure of the monetary overhang, the estimate 
of the ratio of  money to gross domestic product (GDP) (row 6 in table 1.1) 
gives a rough indication. If 0.4 can be considered the norm, there was no over- 
4. By 1982, over 50 percent of consumer goods were free of control, the percentage gradually 
increasing to 80 percent by  1990 and to over 90 percent in 1991. Trade liberalization proceeded 
more slowly. On the Hungarian economic reform process since  1968, see Boote and Somogyi 
(1991). For a good account of the more recent economic developments, see the OECD survey on 
Hungary (OECD 1992). 
5. Also,  in  Poland  the  weakening  of  state  control had  already  started  in  1981, with  two 
Solidarity-induced laws that gave a measure of autonomy to firms and induced the beginning of a 
private sector outside agriculture. Poland’s other institutional reforms, however, lagged behind 
Hungary’s (see Lipton and Sachs 1991). 23  Stabilization and Reform in Eastern Europe: A Preliminary Evaluation 
~  ~~~ 
Table 1.1  Eastern Europe: Initial Conditions 
Indicator  Hungary  Poland  Czechoslovakia  Bulgaria  Romania 
Population (in millions, mid-1989)” 
GNP per capita (in 1989 US  $)’ 
GNP growth (average annual rate, 
in %, at constant prices):b 
1970s 
1980s 
Administered prices (% of total) 
State ownership (96) 
Money (M2)/GDP (1990) 
External debt/GDP (1990, %) 
External debt-service ratio (1990) 
Exports to CMEA, 1990:g 
% of total exports 
























































“World Bank (1991); IMF staff estimate for Romanian GNP per capita. All these data are highly 
sensitive to the choice of exchange rates. 
bNet  material product (ICES 1990). 
‘Excluding food prices. 
dEconomy-wide. 
‘Economy-wide, except 15 percent of agriculture. 
‘In percentage of merchandise exports. 
SEstimates are tentative since they are. very sensitive to distortions in intra-CMEA prices and ex- 
change rates. Data for exports are based on estimated world market prices (considerably above the 
official traded prices); however, the GDP data are based on actual official prices. For Romania, 
export data are available only at official prices, which tend to underestimate the weight of CMEA 
trade; on this basis, CMEA exports were 39 percent of total exports and equivalent to 6 percent 
of GDP. 
hang in Hungary at the start of  the reform process; it was large in Poland (in 
1989 and probably  even larger before  1989) and  Bulgaria and  smaller in 
Czechoslovakia and Romania. 
It is interesting that, during the twenty years following the spring of  1968, 
Czechoslovakia reverted to the most orthodox centrally planned economy (see 
table  1.1) and  was  thus, in a structural sense, much  less prepared for the 
big change. Yet, on the eve of the January 1991 reform, not only did Czecho- 
slovakia enjoy the most favorable initial internal and external macroeconomic 
balance, but it also had only a small monetary overhang and an extremely low 
ratio of external debt to gross national product (GNP).6 
6.  In  an  interesting  recounting  of  economic  developments  in  these  countries  in  the  pre- 
Communist era (Solimano 1991). Czechoslovakia stands out as having had a prudent macroeco- 
nomic tradition. It also had the most developed industrial structure by the time communism took 
over. Major subsequent development took place in Slovakia, which has undoubtedly had repercus- 
sions on Czechoslovakia’s present structural reform process and interrepublican political and so- 
cial problems. 24  Michael Bruno 
Bulgaria had the most extensive industrial development in  relation to its 
starting point (with some 60 percent of the labor force in that sector, compared 
to a mere 20 percent in the 1930s), much of it confined to exports to the former 
Soviet Union (see row 9 in table 1.1). In the years since 1985, Bulgaria in- 
curred a sizable external debt as its foreign finances faltered, and the country 
faced a severe foreign exchange constraint by the time the reform started as 
well as a substantial monetary overhang. Romania, which had no external debt 
at all and was less dependent on CMEA trade, was nonetheless plagued by 
severe internal economic, social, and political problems, on top of specific sup- 
ply problems in the oil market. 
At the beginning of  1991, three of the countries-Czechoslovakia,  Bulgaria, 
and Romania-adopted  programs that essentially resembled the Polish pro- 
gram of  1990. (For a comparison of programs, see table 1.2.) The main break- 
away from their past was an almost complete price liberalization and a substan- 
tial elimination of  price subsidies, with the aim of  achieving fiscal balance, 
coupled with the establishment of strict monetary targets and wage ceilings. 
The choice of exchange rate regime differed, with Czechoslovakia, like Poland 
in 1990, adopting a peg as a nominal anchor (after several devaluations in the 
preceding months, which almost doubled the exchange rate). Lacking foreign 
exchange reserves, Bulgaria and Romania both floated and let the interbank 
market determine a considerably  depreciated exchange rate, thereby tripling 
the previous official rate (fig. 1.  l),  although the phasing in of the exchange rate 
reform was more gradual in Romania. In all four countries, the external reform 
program included substantial trade liberalization with current account convert- 
ibility and other measures and institutional changes pertaining to structural 
adjustment and privatization. 
Hungary adopted a gradualist program in January  1991, involving a much 
smaller devaluation (15 percent),  a further liberalization of  prices (up to 90 
percent of the consumer basket by the end of 1991, a considerable stepping up 
of the previous gradual move from 56 percent in 1985), and restrictive fiscal, 
monetary, and incomes policies. The program, which was more ambitious than 
previous programs, also included a substantial further liberalization of imports 
and another set of structural adjustment and privatization measures.’ 
The programs for Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania were ob- 
viously conceived as “big bang” moves. The underlying theme was that, with 
few exceptions, the price and trade systems had to be liberalized all at once 
under the umbrella of fiscal, monetary, and incomes restraint. At the same time, 
new financial institutions were being put in place, and the.productive systems 
were slated for rapid privatization so as to minimize the uncertainties of opera- 
tion under public ownership and controls. 
7. The average tariff dropped from 18 percent in 1985 to 16 percent during 1986-89  and to 13 
percent in 1991. The share of imports liberalized rose from 0 to  16 percent in 1989 and 37 percent 
in 1990, to reach 72 percent in 1991 (see Dervis and Condon, in this volume). Table 1.2  Eastern Europe: Comparison of Fund Programs 
Indicator  Hungary  Poland  Czechoslovakia  Bulgaria  Romania 
Date  20 February 1991  5 February 1990 
Length  36 months  13 months 
Exchange system  15% devaluation in  Initial sizable 
January, then managed  devaluations, then fixed 
Wages  Tax-based incomes policy  Tax-based incomes policy 
Interest rates  With abolition of interest  Establish positive real 
rate ceilings will be 
market based 
interest rates 
Privatization  Continue in 1991  Continue in 1991 
'Wo-tier banking  1987  1990 
system" 
7 January 1991 
14 months 
35% devaluation in 
October, 1990; 15% 
devaluation and 
unification with tourist 
rate in December 1990; 
then fixed 
Tax-based incomes policy 
Increase before program 
and flexible 
management thereafter 
Start in 1991 
1990 
15 March 1991 
12 months 
Floating interbank 
Real wage cut by  35%, 
implemented by 
ceilings on wage 
bills 




Start in 1991 
1989 
11 April 1991 
12 months 
Official rate fixed; 
floating interbank 
Convergence of official 
and interbank 
Tax-based incomes policy 
Complete liberalization; 
CDs with flexible rates 
Start in 1991 
1990 
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Fig. 1.1  Exchange rates, 1989-92 (end of period: local currency/U.S. dollar, in 
log scale) 
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In all five countries, the initial price liberalization was expected to involve a 
substantial price shock, to be followed a few months later by  relative price 
stability. The actual results are discussed in section 1.3. 
1.2  Concepts of Economic Reform-Big  Bang and Gradualism 
The key  question that has to be asked at the outset of  any major reform 
process is whether to adopt the big bang approach or gradualism in the move 
from the distorted equilibrium of the prereform period to the desired new quasi 
equilibrium. The answer to this question is not at all clear. Cumulative experi- 
ence from hyperinflation and high-inflation episodes (say, at least three-digit 
annual inflation rates) points only to the clear advantage of the big bang ap- 
proach at the inflation stabilization stage (recent successes have been Bolivia, 
Mexico, and Israel).8 
In the recent successful stabilizations in Israel and Mexico, credibility, ex- 
pectation signaling, and the problem of nominal synchronization (i.e., avoiding 
sharp changes in relative prices) dictated a multiple anchor or “heterodox” 
approach. The initial hyperinflation outburst prompted Poland and Yugoslavia 
to follow this approach in the 1989-90  stabilizations. Czechoslovakia, Bul- 
garia, and Romania also chose a big bang approach in 199  l,  even though their 
inflation rates were relatively  Given the repressed prereform system, the 
potential for inflationary outburst may  have justified their choice, which en- 
abled them to avoid the hyperinflation that would have erupted in the price 
liberalization stage in the absence of tight macro policies. 
These choices, however, apply only to price stabilization and the achieve- 
ment of initial internal and external balance. There still remains the question 
of how much and how fast one should go on a broader reform front. For ex- 
ample, do trade liberalization and a move to convertibility, let alone privatiza- 
tion, necessarily require a big bang approach? The answer is much less clear 
ex ante and is even less clear given the results. Trade liberalization, for exam- 
ple, can give the right long-term signal from the start, but its execution could, 
in principle, be gradual. (This question will be taken up in the discussion of 
output collapse in sec. 1.3.) Similar examples in either direction can be cited, 
such as the opening up of internal and external financial and capital markets. 
The United Kingdom opted to go cold turkey, while other European countries 
chose to move more gradually and nonetheless achieved their targets. Israel 
applied shock therapy to inflation but opened up its financial, capital, and for- 
8. Chile’s 1970  stabilization  is the only successful example of the gradualist approach (the trade 
liberalization, interestingly enough, was done relatively quickly). The social cost, however, was 
extremely high, and the strategy would probably not be feasible in an open democracy. For a 
comparative analysis of  the stabilization and reform experience in Latin America and Israel, see 
Bruno (1993). Fischer and Gelb (1990) were among the first to discuss the phases of  reform for 
Eastern Europe. 
9.  Hungary could afford gradualism because, as noted earlier, its opening up  and structural 
reform process had been going on for much longer-in  a sense, since 1968. 28  Michael Bruno 
eign exchange markets gradually (as it successfully did with trade liberaliza- 
tion in the 1960s). 
A closely related issue is the speed of adjustment of markets to changes in 
signals and the credibility that agents attach to announced signals of  future 
market environments that  are not yet  evident in today’s  markets. It is well 
known that the speed of  adjustment in asset markets is extremely high; the 
response is often instantaneous because the adjustment costs are low. However, 
adjustment in commodity and labor markets, let alone the production response 
that follows from new investment, is considerably slower, often lasting three 
or four years. Any reform such as privatization of large-scale enterprises or the 
introduction for the first time of  a value-added or income tax that requires 
complicated legislation, the introduction of new accounting procedures, and 
new implementation or monitoring mechanisms may take at least as long as 
that. 
It is important to stress that these long adjustment lags do not occur solely 
in hitherto centrally planned economies. Structural adjustment is a slow pro- 
cess even in the most advanced market-based economy-even  when the re- 
form is credible. This was true of  the reconstruction effort in Europe after 
World War I1 and of  structural adjustment efforts following on a successful 
major stabilization (such as in Israel in the wake of  the 1985 stabilization). 
Even in a country like Finland, the collapse of the CMEA caused a substantial 
drop in GDP. In all these cases, adjustment was or will be prolonged, even 
though the underlying structure is market based. 
Therefore, the advocate of  a big bang has to make clear which particular 
portion of  the policy package is implied. Also, the argument for a big bang 
beginning may rest on a special political opportunity, as in Poland. But there 
may also be an intertemporal political trade-off  overly costly programs might 
lead to political reversal at a later stage, as “adjustment fatigue” sets in or 
social aspirations, such as employment opportunities and living standards, are 
frustrated. Have policymakers sufficiently considered these questions at the 
inception stage of the program? 
It is not clear whether there were any illusions about the length of  time 
it would take the East European economies to attain the competitive market 
structure, private ownership, and properly functioning financial system of  a 
typical Western economy. But there seems to have been overoptimism at the 
onset of the programs about the speed of the supply response and other behav- 
ioral responses that could come in the wake of  a drastic change in the eco- 
nomic environment. 
1.3  Stabilization: Was the Initial Price Shock Necessary? 
In all cases except Hungary, the initial price shock turned out to be substan- 
tially larger than expected, but, within six months of  the program, inflation 
came down to less than 2-3  percent a month in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and 29  Stabilization and Reform in Eastern Europe: A Preliminary Evaluation 
Hungary. Inflation edged up, after a temporary drop, to an  average monthly 
rate of  4-5  percent in Bulgaria and  10 percent in Romania (see averages in 
table 1.3 and monthly data in table 1.4 and fig. 1.2). However, by  the end of 
199  1, only Czechoslovakia and Hungary were running annual rates of inflation 
below 20 percent,1° or a monthly rate of less than 1.5 percent, while Poland's 
rate has been running at least twice as high (about 3.0-3.5  percent a month, or 
40 percent a year). The Czechoslovak stabilization was virtually a textbook 
case-the  initial price shock was followed by price stability throughout most 
of the second half of  1991 (fig. 1.2 and table 1.4). 
Differences in initial conditions no doubt played an important role. Poland 
started its program in the midst of a hyperinflation caused by a series of price 
hikes that may or may not have eliminated the monetary overhang by January 
1990 (this issue is in dispute). At any rate, a 45 percent price shock was fore- 
cast for January 1990, but the actual outcome was 80 percent (for January and 
February together; the respective figures are 67 percent forecast and 122 per- 
cent actual). During the whole of  1990, inflation was expected to be less than 
100 percent and ended up at about 250 percent; thus, even the residual infla- 
tion, after the initial shock, turned out to be higher than planned. 
For Czechoslovakia, which started from a stable price level and a consider- 
ably smaller monetary overhang, a price increase of only 25 percent was fore- 
cast. The actual increase was 40 percent in the first quarter of  1991, a smaller 
relative discrepancy than Poland's. Moreover, the residual inflation in Czecho- 
slovakia during the first year was only 10 percentage points higher than ex- 
pected, after allowing for the first quarter's shock. 
Both Bulgaria and Romania started off from a much worse initial position 
and made a number of  additional price corrections during the year,  so it is 
probably too early to pass judgment on the success of the initial move, particu- 
larly for Romania. The sharp foreign exchange shortage in these two countries, 
which necessitated the adoption of a different exchange rate regime at the start 
and a considerably larger initial exchange rate hike, may also account for the 
worse subsequent inflation profile. As in other aspects, Hungary was an outlier. 
Its initial price shock was small, 10 percent, as expected, and its residual infla- 
tion also hit the target (table 1.3). 
Three questions arise in the face of these initial price developments, after 
due consideration is taken of the fact that price comparisons between a postlib- 
eralization system and a distorted and rationed preliberalization stage impart a 
considerable upward bias to the data." Why was the price shock in most cases 
so much higher than expected? What are the implications of the initial shock 
for the subsequent inflation profile (the implications for the real system will be 
discussed later)? Was an initial price shock as large as Poland's necessary? 
10. This is a convenient reference point because it corresponds to recent inflation rates in the 
11. An interesting question is whether different initial conditions in the various countries might 
successful stabilizers of high inflation-Bolivia,  Chile, Israel, and Mexico (see Bruno 1993). 
have led to different relative biases in these price shock estimates. 30  Michael Bruno 
Table 1.3  Eastern Europe: Selected Indicators, 1990-91 
Convertible  Convertible 
Consumer  Nominal  Broad  Budget  Current  Current  Total 
ProgradActual  GDP'.b  Pricesc  Wage'  Money'  Balanced.'  Accounr  Account'  Exports'E 
Hungary 
1990 actual  -4  33  23  29  -.l  .4  .I  8.9 
1991 program  -3  31  ...  23  -1.5  -3.6  -1.2  12.6 
1991 actual  -8  32  20  29  -4.1  1  .o  .3  9.6 
(-8) 
Poland 
1989 actual  ...  640  472  236  -7.4  -2.7  -1.8  8.1 
1990 program  -5  94  ...  87  -.I  ...  -3.0  ... 
1990actual  -12  249  160  122  3.5  1.3  .7  15.0 
199 1 program  3  36  ...  43  -  .6  -2.7  -2.7  ... 
1991 actual  -8  60  54  49  -7.2  -2.9  -2.2  13.2 
(-4) 
Czechoslovakia 
1990 actual  ...  18  8  1  -.3  -2.4  -1.1  11.6 
1991 program  -5  30  17  6  .8  -7.1  -2.5  12.6 
1991 actual  -16  54  14  27  -2.1  .7  .2  10.9 
(-9) 
Bulgaria 
1990actual  -12  64  32  12  -9.2  -16.1  -  1.2  5.7 
1991 program  -11  234  146  24  .1  ...  -2.0  6.6 
1991 actual  -23  339  142  25  -3.7  -11.8  -  .9  3.7 
(- 16) 
Romania 
1990 actual  -7  5  11  17  -  .5  -8.0  -  1.7  5.8 
1991 estimate  -12  223  124  66  -3.0  -6.6  -1.3  3.5 
1991program  . . .  104  ...  15  -1.5  ...  -1.7  5.4 
(- 10) 
'Figures in parentheses provide an estimate of the fall of GDP owing to the fall in exports; percentage pint  contribution 
of the change in total exports to the percentage change in GDI? 
bFigures  given in terms of  percentage change. 
'Figures  given in terms of year-end percentage change. 
dFor Poland, general government balance; for Czechoslovakia, central and local government, extrabudgetary funds, 
excluding takeover of export credits, and transfers to the banks and foreign trade organizations on account of devalua- 
tion profits and  losses; for Bulgaria, based on  actual external debt service payments; for 1991, after external debt 
rescheduling and debt referral. 
'Figures given in terms of percentage of GDP. 
'Including transactions in nonconvertible currencies. 
gFigures given in billions of  US.  dollars. 31  Stabilization and Reform in Eastern Europe: A Preliminary Evaluation 
Table 1.4  Eastern Europe: Monthly CPI Inflation Rates, 1989-91  (%) 
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3.4  ... 
3.6  ... 
1.8  ... 
4.5  ... 
5.7  ... 
5.0  23.4 
5.9  11.6 
12.7  14.8 
6.7  7.0 
4.5  6.6 
2.1  26.5 
2.7  5.1 
4.9  2.0 
.I  9.4 
.6  11.2 
4.3  7.3 
3.2  10.4 
3.2  10.4 
3.1  13.7 
~ 
Sources: National authorities and IMF staff estimates. 
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Fig. 1.2  CPI inflation and exchange rates, 1989-91  (monthly percentage 
change) 
Sources: National authorities and  IMF staff estimates. 
“CPI: February 1991 = 105.2. Exchange rate: February 1991 = 247.1, March 1991 = 30.5. 
bExchange  rate: November 1991 = 204.84. 33  Stabilization and Reform in Eastern Europe: A Preliminary Evaluation 
Possible sources of  the unexpectedly high price level shocks include the 
existence of  a larger unabsorbed monetary overhang, underprediction of  the 
effects of a large initial devaluation, and monopolistic behavior on the part of 
state enterprises in anticipation of the imposition of price controls. In Bulgaria, 
and partly in Poland, the initial monetary overhang may have played a sizable 
role, whereas, in the other countries (in particular, Poland), the price response 
to the exchange rate devaluation alone or combined with other factors may 
have been responsible. Inflationary experience elsewhere has shown that the 
exchange rate, in the absence of  another reliable measuring rod, often serves 
as the indicator to which pricing agents attach themselves, even when their 
product is not tradable.’* 
The answer to the second question about the relation of the initial shock to 
the subsequent inflation profile depends on whether the source of the shock is 
indeed confined to an existing monetary overhang. It would then follow that a 
higher initial price jump would “save” the system from additional inflationary 
adjustments later on, and there would thus be a positive trade-off between the 
initial shock and subsequent price stability. 
If  a monetary overhang is not the cause of the price shock, and if there is 
also a tendency for other nominal magnitudes in the system (money, credit, 
and wages) to “catch up” in line with their initial “planned” positions relative 
to the price level, then an initial price level discrepancy will also lead, through 
inertia, to higher than expected inflation. This may have been what happened 
in Poland and Bulgaria, but probably not, or less so, in Czechoslovakia. In the 
second half of  1990, money, credit, and wage ceilings were adjusted upward 
in Poland, and a similar correction was made in the second half of  1991 in 
Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria. In  Poland, the difference between the actual 
wage and the wage ceiling in the earlier phase could be made up later, and 
enterprise managers availed themselves of this option, paying substantial addi- 
tional taxes while doing so. 
Hence, the third question: Was there an option of  a smaller planned, or a 
smaller actual, price shock at the beginning? Technically, the answer is yes. 
Compare these programs to one successful heterodox predecessor: Israel in 
July 1985. With the substantial elimination of  subsidies, Israel limited its ini- 
tial price shock to 27 percent by opting for an attenuated devaluation (relative 
to what the fundamentals seemed to dictate) and introduced temporary price 
controls that were then gradually removed. However, there was obviously no 
monetary overhang, and the relative price levels were certainly not as distorted 
as those in the East European economies. 
Yet it may be argued that Poland could have chosen a smaller devaluation 
up front and left price controls at a higher level for three months, say, and only 
12. In Israel, this is called the dentist efect (because dentists raise their fees by the  same rate at 
which the  price of their material  inputs rises, even though these inputs constitute only a small 
portion of the cost of treatment). 34  Michael Bruno 
then decontrolled completely, either all at once or grad~a1ly.l~  But it could also 
be argued that, with distortions as big as they were and the new government’s 
initial high credibility, it may have been just as well to “chop off the dog’s tail 
all at once.” 
It is interesting that Czechoslovakia retained some control over its initial 
price shock through moral suasion and by stipulating maximum prices or trade 
margins on some key commodities and by requiring prior notification of price 
increases in some monopolistic sectors. Also, in Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, 
certain price increases, such as for energy and housing, were delayed. 
Do the initial benefits of a big price bang outweigh the subsequent costs of 
higher inertial inflation as well as other social costs? In pursuit of its devalua- 
tion and price liberalization goals, Poland was probably right in choosing to 
abolish price controls at the beginning, but it could have devalued by less and 
thus reduced the initial shock. The exchange rate may  then have  had to be 
realigned earlier than mid- 199  1, but the cumulative price increase over the 
two-year period could nonetheless have been smaller. For Bulgaria and Roma- 
nia, the question arises whether they could afford to opt for a far-reaching 
relaxation of foreign exchange restrictions when the foreign exchange shortage 
was (and is) so extreme. One counterargument is that the administration of 
such restrictions would be ineffective. 
Ending on a positive note-with  all the quibbles afforded by hindsight duly 
noted-the  ovemding fact remains that in most of the cases far-reaching liber- 
alization has been achieved, together with a reasonable measure of macroeco- 
nomic stability, in spite of a highly distorted starting point and immense eco- 
nomic  and  political  risks.  Finally,  from  the  consumer’s  perspective,  the 
qualitative change that has taken place in the market environment probably 
outweighs the statistical measure of price increase. 
1.4  Was the Output Collapse Unavoidable? 
There are several reasons for the large output fall. First of all, the anticipa- 
tion of a sharp price increase stimulates hoarding, which is immediately fol- 
lowed by  a substantial reduction in demand. Next, when prices rise by  more 
than was planned while money, credit, and wages are kept within their speci- 
fied nominal ceilings, the obvious result is a considerably larger than expected 
reduction in real money and credit as well as in real wages. This happened in 
Poland  in  1990 and  was  repeated in  the other countries that  experienced 
shocks. 
13. In the Polish case, in the initial absence of alternative inflation-immune financial assets, the 
free market exchange rate reflected a stock demand and far exceeded the relevant purchasing 
power parity exchange rate. This was the reason the authorities chose a smaller devaluation than 
initially planned. Ex post it may still have been too high-note  that it took a year and a half of 
substantial inflation until the real appreciation of the exchange rate began to “bite” from a competi- 
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How much of the output reduction, which was considerably larger than ex- 
pected, can be directly linked to this price shock discrepancy? The results for 
the Polish program of 1990 show a considerable reduction in measured output, 
of around 12 percent, compared to a considerably lower f0reca~t.I~  Both the 
real wage squeeze and the real monetary squeeze certainly affected consumer 
demand and thus depressed output on the demand side. 
The credit squeeze can also operate on the firm supply side if the financing 
of  working capital is considered to be one of  the factors of production (see 
Calvo and Coricelli 1992). Another channel through which the credit squeeze 
operates is the real interest rate if nominal interest rates are initially set at a 
level that is too high relative to the inflation rate that is expected after the initial 
price level shock. There is some evidence that the high initial real interest rate 
has in fact constrained firms more than the quantity of crediti5  (to which they 
can and, in fact, did adjust through interfirm credit arrears). However, how 
much of the output decline, even in 1990, could be ascribed to this factor alone 
remains an open question. 
1.4.1  Supply-Side Shock 
In Poland, as well as in some of  the other countries, there was a general 
shock on the supply-side, which can be termed a comprehensive management 
shock. Enterprise managers who were used to operating in a command envi- 
ronment where their “market” was assured and their financing accommodative 
suddenly had to make their own decisions in a completely transformed envi- 
ronment characterized by tremendous uncertainty. In these circumstances, the 
first natural impulse is to adopt a “wait and see” attitude, or to continue produc- 
ing the old stuff for inventory, as long as there is working capital. Evidence 
points to unfulfilled credit ceilings in  the  first few  months of  the  Polish, 
Czechoslovak, and Bulgarian programs, followed by  a period in which credit 
ceilings were effective but wage ceilings were not reached. This situation was 
repeated during much of  1991 in the Bulgarian and Romanian programs. In 
Bulgaria and Romania (and, earlier, Czechoslovakia), the nominal interest rate 
was  set at a level corresponding to the estimated postshock rate of  inflation, 
rather than at a level that would ensure a positive real rate of interest in the first 
month. It is important to remember, however, that, in these three countries, 
unlike the Polish case, there was no preceding hyperinflation to contend with. 
Therefore, that a more moderate interest rate policy did not lead to an infla- 
tionary outburst is no proof that this policy should have been pursued in a 
hyperinflationary situation (such as Russia’s). 
It is important to remember that a credit crunch and high real interest rates 
14. There is some doubt about the relevance of the -5  percent projected output drop. According 
to participants in the planning stage, this estimate had been arbitrary and was not based directly 
on any of the plan parameters. 
15. This information comes from an  unpublished World Bank report based on interviews in 
seventy-five state-owned enterprises in September 1991. 36  Michael Bruno 
are a universal problem in the immediate aftermath of  sharp stabilizations (as 
was true for Bolivia, Mexico, and Israel). It could also be argued that the uncer- 
tainty about the outcome of stabilization  justifies a highly contractionary mon- 
etary policy as a support for the exchange rate or wage anchors. Of  the mis- 
takes that can be made, it is better to err on the side of  an overly restrictive 
stance. However, once initial success is achieved, a gradual, although careful, 
relaxation is called for. 
1.4.2  CMEA Collapse 
The collapse of the CMEA was another major contributor to the fall in out- 
put. Table  1.2 provides rough IMF staff estimates of  that part of  the output 
drop in 1991 that can be ascribed to the fall in exports caused by  the demise 
of the CMEA. This estimate was based on the demand side, under the assump- 
tion of no short-run market substitutability (which obviously did not hold for 
Hungary or Czechoslovakia; see sec. 1.7). It did not explicitly take into account 
the very sharp terms of  trade effect of  the collapse, which was a substantial 
exogenous supply shock, much like the effect of the relative rise of energy and 
raw  materials prices on the industrial countries in the 1970s and 1980s. It is 
interesting that, with the exception of Hungary, the implied unaccountable drop 
in output shown in table 1.3 seems to be correlated with the degree of  prior 
dependence of the country on CMEA trade (table 1.1, row 9), which may be a 
proxy for the relative size of the potential terms of trade shock.I6 
The CMEA collapse caused the most damage in Bulgaria, the bulk of whose 
exports had gone to the CMEA. Bulgaria and also Romania, saddled by their 
foreign currency restraint, suffered severely from a lack of raw  material^.'^ The 
relatively larger fall in Poland’s output in  1991 than seems warranted by  its 
dependence on CMEA trade may  have  to do with the degree of  rigidity in 
wages. In Poland, the real product wage did not continue to fall in  1991 but 
rather increased by  15 percent, thus exacerbating the effect on the terms of 
trade. At  any rate, more detailed country studies of the components of the 
output collapse are needed before we can assess how big a margin needs to be 
explained over and above the effects of the CMEA collapse in 1991. 
To what extent was this unprecedented output drop unavoidable? Even if it 
could not have been avoided, it is not clear whether other policies-such  as 
structural adjustment policies and privatization-can  facilitate a rebound in 
16. A recent estimate by Rodrik (1992) of the trade shock in the former Soviet Union, which 
includes the effect on the terms of trade for Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, is remarkably 
close to the numbers appearing in the brackets in table 1.3, so they may include terms of trade 
effects after all. In any case, neither the IMPS  nor Rodrik’s estimates include Keynesian multiplier 
effects or the effect of aggregate supply curve shifts under wage rigidity (see Bruno and Sachs 
1985). 
17. This is a clear case in which the short-run marginal product of additional infusion of foreign 
capital inflow is very high. Given excess capacity in complementary factors of production, the 
marginal GDP product of foreign exchange equals the reciprocal of  the ratio of raw materials 
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output in the near future. A substitute for the CMEA in the form of a payments 
union or trade arrangement would certainly help. Given the financial and politi- 
cal problems of the former Soviet Union, it is not clear how well such an ar- 
rangement could have worked during 1991, but even maintaining some of the 
distorted bilateral arrangements during the transition could probably have soft- 
ened the blow. 
Given the magnitude of the output shock and the long time it takes for the 
productive system to respond to the new market signals, ways should be found 
to soften the blow to output and employment in the interim period, even if they 
may seem distorted from the long-run point of view. Government intervention 
in other forms is the likely alternative-extending  credit and granting subsid- 
ies to ailing enterprises in a particular region or assigning larger budgetary 
allotments to unemployment relief. 
1.4.3  Exchange and Trade Policies 
The wisdom of applying the cold turkey solution to trade liberalization can 
be questioned, and moving in stages to current account convertibility through 
gradual reduction of  tariff barriers may be a sensible policy (see Greene and 
Isard 1991; Tanzi  1991; and McKinnon 1991). There are strong arguments in 
favor of eliminating import licensing and quotas at one go, but there is no good 
inherent reason to move all at once to a zero, or very low, tariff. It is true that 
a gradualist strategy may lend itself to discretionary reversals by  governments 
with low credibility. But, when it is credible, the strategy can mitigate the im- 
mediate output and employment costs while continuing to send the right price 
signals for long-term investment. If  the strategy is to be credible, a commit- 
ment has to be made to a well-defined time path from a differentiated tariff 
structure toward a common low tariff within a few years (no more than, say, 
five). Examples  of  successful liberalizations that  followed a preannounced 
gradualist  path  include  the  European  Common  Market,  whose  members 
agreed to a gradual mutual removal of tariffs in the  1950s and 1960s,’*  and 
individual countries, such as Israel, whose trade liberalization in the  1960s 
followed a gradualist path. 
Even when the gradual path is chosen, the question remains whether initial 
tariffs should be differentiated across goods. To avoid political pressures, the 
policymaker may  choose, for example, to differentiate only by general cate- 
gory of goods (raw materials, investment, and consumption goods) rather than 
by  individual commodity or producer. In the next section, which takes up the 
fiscal balance, I argue in favor of a flat across-the-board tariff for purely fiscal 
reasons, until a value-added tax (VAT) is introduced. 
A country that has opted for an ambitious trade reform from the start may 
not want to backtrack at a later stage because of loss of credibility, but it is a 
18. In the case of the Common Market, it has taken quite a few years to phase out declining 
industries-e.g.,  coal and steel. 38  Michael Bruno 
lesson to bear in mind for future reference (e.g., in the states of  the former 
Soviet Union), and, in fact, Poland eventually introduced a new  and higher 
tariff structure in the second half of  199  1. For some countries, however, the 
introduction of customs duties or tariffs may not be feasible, either because of 
the complete openness of  their borders or because of  the lack of  necessary 
administrative capabilities. Unfortunately, that argument could also hold for 
any taxation, such as the VAT. 
1.4.4  Future Prospects 
Even when the output downturn is reversed, the experience of past reform 
and structural change (elsewhere as well as in Eastern Europe) shows evidence 
of substantial labor shedding and increasing unemployment, even as output re- 
bounds. 
Although public-sector output is collapsing, the small-scale private sector, 
especially in trade and services, seems to be thriving. However, given this sec- 
tor’s small initial base, even large increases at an early stage cannot affect the 
overall result unless the country starts off with a larger private sector to begin 
with. Poland may have been in this situation by  1992, when aggregate GDP 
started rising; at the time of  writing, one can rely only on partial evidence 
and varying interpretations of the meaning of  some numbers-for  example, 
on unemployment. Although unemployment in Bulgaria had reached 10 per- 
cent, some have argued that there can be no serious unemployment problem if 
one cannot even find domestic help willing to work at the minimum wage; 
other  observers have  claimed  that  serious unemployment  problems  were 
emerging among the young. Both allegations may be correct, just as zero un- 
employment in Budapest or Prague can be entirely consistent with very serious 
unemployment in other heavily industrialized regions. It has also been argued 
that the Bulgarian state sector could sustain a major reduction in employment 
with minimum social upheaval because many of these workers could return to 
family farms or work on their own privately owned plots. For a country with 
excessive industrialization (60 percent of  the labor force!), a shift to small- 
scale services, trade, and agriculture could be considered a move toward the 
correct long-run equilibrium composition of output. 
For policy planners, the most relevant issue is the likelihood of immediate 
reversals in output and, especially, in the employment downturn because this 
outcome will determine the economic and, especially, the political sustainabil- 
ity of the initial set of stabilization policies. 
1.5  Can the Fiscal Balance Be Sustained? 
A key feature of the initial stabilization phase in all cases has been the bal- 
ancing of the budget, primarily through a substantial, permanent cut in subsid- 
ies on goods and services, on the one hand, and an increase in expenditure on 
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balance was assumed to be assured, as the figures for the respective programs 
show (see table  1.3). Keeping the budget in balance always requires careful 
scrutiny so that transitory changes can be isolated from permanent changes. 
Although the initial budget outcome seemed satisfactory in most countries, 
subsequent developments (usually starting in the second half of the first year) 
point to the emergence of serious problems for the second and third years of 
the programs. Let us consider the various causes and implications of  these 
developments, starting with the experience of Poland. 
At  first glance, the Polish fiscal performance in  1990 turned out to be a 
surprising success, switching from a deficit of about 7 percent of GDP in 1989 
to a surplus of  about 3.5 percent. As  Lane (1991) showed in detail, it was 
initially expected that the budget would follow a U-shaped profile over the 
year, with a shortfall in revenue in the first part of the year and an approximate 
balance over the year as a whole. In actual fact, the balance followed an in- 
verted U shape, with an increasing surplus in the first two quarters of  1990, 
turning into a drop in the surplus in the third quarter and a deficit in the fourth 
quarter of  1990. The estimates for 1991 showed a deficit of 7.2 percent for the 
year (compared to a planned approximate balance), with the prospect of  an 
even larger deficit for 1992 if no corrective action were taken.I9 
The reasons for this outcome are important for future reference. The price 
surprise led to an unexpected deep fall in real wages resulting in larger-than- 
expected profits and higher tax revenues. To these revenues was added a tax 
on capital gains on inventories and foreign currency deposits. Revenue from 
the latter was an entirely fortuitous one-time effect, resulting from an improper 
accounting  for  inflation.  Once  real  wages  rebounded  and  profits  were 
squeezed, returns on the profit tax fell substantially. The profit squeeze has 
persisted into 1991 and is the more permanent effect of the liberalization pro- 
cess (see McKinnon 1991). 
Czechoslovakia has gone through a similar process: a temporary surplus in 
the first few months of  1991 and an increasing deficit toward the end of  the 
year. Similar problems are also emerging in Bulgaria, which differs from the 
others by not having had its enterprises’ initial capital gains taxed away. Bul- 
garia showed a large increase in its deficit along with the output and import 
collapse. Romania’s budget has stayed close to balance. In Hungary’s budget, a 
deficit of close to 4 percent has emerged, despite the new VAT  and income tax. 
As was shown by  Tanzi (1991), the East European countries typically en- 
joyed a profit tax revenue of about 15-20  percent of  GDP, compared to a 3 
percent average for the OECD. Table 1.5, based on Kopits (1991), gives an 
average breakdown of general government revenues and expenditures for 1985 
in the five East European countries, compared with the former Soviet Union 
and the European Community. Although the cut in subsidies may account for 
19. The deficit includes arrears to the nonbank public and unpaid obligations of the government 
to the domestic banking system. The cash deficit for 1991 is estimated at 5.7 percent. 40  Michael Bruno 
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a savings of 8-10  percent of GDP on the expenditure side, additional safety net 
expenditures and unemployment benefits are likely to expand as the process of 
structural change and labor shedding deepens. Further, the drop in enterprise 
profit taxes is likely to continue to exceed the net drop in expenditures. 
A critical problem in all five countries is the transition from a relatively 
egalitarian and well-endowed social welfare network to a market system in 
which all the income and wealth distribution problems, unemployment risks, 
and other adverse social side effects of free capitalism suddenly emerge. Poli- 
cymakers will face strong social and political pressures to continue the existing 
generous social security services and to correct for their recent erosion brought 
about by the sharp price increases. A large percentage of voters in these coun- 
tries are pensioners. In Hungary, where 25 percent of the population are pen- 
sioners, male employees retire at 60 and females at 55. In Bulgaria pensioners 
are estimated to account for 35 percent of the voters, and the relative number 
of people receiving pensions in Poland has recently exceeded 40 percent. In 
Czechoslovakia, pressure may also come from the higher-than-average unem- 
ployment rate in the Slovak Republic (over 11 percent by the end of 1991 and 
rising, compared with a rate in the Czech Republic that was only 4 percent in 
1991 and virtually zero a year earlier). Despite these pressures, there is room 
for streamlining the social welfare framework-for  example, through priva- 
tization of  some of the health services, charging for medication, and progres- 
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One way  or another, the net budget outcome is likely to be a permanent 
imbalance, unless output, sales, and the profit base rebound quickly or new 
taxes are imposed. Past experience shows that the introduction of a VAT  takes 
at least three years in a country with reasonably organized enterprise accounts, 
and it is unlikely that this period can be effectively shortened. In the first year 
in which a VAT is introduced and existing taxes are replaced, there tends to be 
a reduction in revenues anyway. There is thus an urgent need to plan for tempo- 
rary substitutes. For example, if trade liberalization  were coupled from the 
beginning with a considerably larger tax on imports (even at a flat rate, say), 
the revenue from this source could have temporarily closed the gap, at least 
in part. 
In the absence of a tax alternative, the pressure to balance the budget usually 
leads to expenditure cuts in areas where political opposition is light but the 
long-term economic cost is high, namely, investment in infrastructure (roads, 
communications). This is the one area where government intervention is usu- 
ally essential and the positive externalities for the long-term growth of the pri- 
vate enterprise sector may be highest. There may be gradations in the urgency 
of  the problem in  the different countries (probably less crucial in Hungary 
and Czechoslovakia, more so in the other economies), but there is a minimum 
requirement in all of them, quite apart from the common need to cope with the 
inherited environmental damage. 
This discussion leads to two important policy considerations. First, should 
some fiscal deficit be allowed for the interim period  (until the tax reform is 
fully in place)? Second, should infrastructure investment be treated as part of 
regular government expenditure? 
The answers to both questions should be considered in the context of each 
economy. The first and most important point is that, given the time-phasing 
nature of the problem, it is important that the annual budget plan should be 
embedded within a well-specified medium-term framework (of three years, at 
least). Ideally, the country should precommit itself to a budget trajectory for 
each of  the coming years, with full budget balance to be regained within, at 
most, three years and the deficit in no year exceeding a certain percentage of 
GDP, say, 4 or 5 percent. The financing of this deficit should not come from 
the central bankz0  but should be the responsibility of the ministry of finance, 
which must finance it from foreign or domestic private-sector borrowing, de- 
pending on the country’s initial internal and external debt situation. A clear 
signal of precommitment along these lines may help prevent the adverse infla- 
20. In theory, once there is positive real growth of GDP, the money supply could be increased, 
assuming stable velocity, at the rate of real growth. However, this decision had best he left to the 
discretion of  monetary policy and an  independent central bank and should not be built in as a 
potential source of  deficit financing. Otherwise, political pressures on the central bank to accom- 
modate a deficit may become ruinous. Recent developments in several of the countries in question 
bear out the importance of  this caveat. 42  Michael Bruno 
tionary or crowding-out effects that a protracted deficit would otherwise en- 
gender. 
Should infrastructure investment be treated differently? A textbook solution 
is to distinguish between the total deficit and the concept of government (dis)- 
saving. The latter is more relevant for gauging the internal balance (although 
the former will still be important for financial planning). In this case, infra- 
structure investment could appear “below the line” as part of a separate capital 
budget that need not be financed by taxes. The objection to this “pure” solution 
is that it leaves the way open for potential abuse. Anything, so practical wis- 
dom says, can be called investment, be it teachers’  salaries, defense expendi- 
tures, or retraining for the unemployed. These loopholes can be closed, how- 
ever,  by  adopting  strict  definitions  of  what  constitutes  direct  government 
investment, limiting the percentage of GDP allowed (say, no more than an extra 
3-5  percent), or not allowing for separation of budgets but raising the allow- 
able total deficit by 1 percent, for example, for each 2 percent of planned addi- 
tional  infrastructure, with  a total ceiling of no more than 5-6  percent. Ear- 
marking specific foreign lending (e.g., by  the World Bank) does, of course, 
ease matters. 
There are no universal rules governing these considerations; they must of 
necessity be geared to each economy’s specific risks or  past record. 
1.6  What to Do with Bad Loan Portfolios and Enterprise Arrears? 
In all the East European countries, the previous economic and financial re- 
gimes left a legacy of bad enterprise debts that have continued to mount and 
have been  stacked in the portfolios of the commercial banking system. The 
stringent stabilization programs, the credit crunch, and the collapse of the ruble 
zone export market have exacerbated the problem, as has the mounting interen- 
terprise debt. In the early stages of  stabilization, this problem was in most 
cases put off to one side. Unfortunately, the problem usually does not go away 
while waiting to be attended to but, on the contrary, gets worse and may inter- 
fere with the process of stabilization and structural adjustment. The existence 
of a large bad loan portfolio on banks’ balance sheets is one of the causes of 
the persistent large gap between deposit and lending interest rates. It may also 
distort the relative creditworthiness of enterprises in a way that is not necessar- 
ily correlated with their potential profitability or long-run solvency in the new 
market environment. 
In theory, the issue of bad loan portfolios is best dealt with up front in the 
context of a broader currency reform. When loan cleanups are included in the 
initial package, there is a better chance of  avoiding the severe moral hazard 
problems that any such cleanups entail. In practice, no such provisions were 
included in the original packages. Even if they had been, the problem would 
have lingered on because much of the outstanding bad debt continued to accu- 
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ence has shown that extreme solutions should be avoided. One extreme is to 
leave the issue out of the central government’s  budgeting perspective altogether 
by  “letting the banks deal with the problem,” which seems to have been the 
prevailing view in Czechoslovakia at one point. If this approach is followed, 
quite apart from sending out the wrong price signals in the credit markets, it 
would eventually lead to a banking crisis, and the government would have to 
step in, and on a much larger scale than would be required  otherwise. The 
other extreme solution is to yield to the cumulative political pressures from the 
debt-ridden enterprise sector and pass blanket debt-cancellation laws, which 
was the approach taken in Romania. Besides being indiscriminate, this solution 
invites serious moral hazard, reinforcing bad borrowing behavior by setting up 
the expectation that next time around enterprises will be bailed out again. 
Outstanding bad debt is estimated at 15-20  percent of total bank debt in 
Hungary and Czechoslovakia and about 30-40  percent in Poland and Bulgaria. 
The ideal solution would be a credible, one-time cleanup of the books, with 
the government buying up debt through the commercial banks on a case-by- 
case basis, cleaning an enterprise only on the basis of  a clear recovery plan, 
with strict conditionality and a strictly enforced budget constraint.*I However, 
this solution is probably unworkable for most of the countries and enterprises 
and banks in question, unless it were introduced during privatization as part of 
a sale bargain. In any event, those enterprises that can be identified as total 
failures should be phased out as quickly as possible. In Hungary, this procedure 
was recently used for the coal mining industry. 
A major problem is the large number of enterprises whose future is uncer- 
tain but that have some potential for restructuring. Some policymakers in these 
countries are resisting across-the-board cleanups, citing an inherited lack of 
credibility  with which the new governments have to contend. In their view, 
announcing in advance that something is to be done once and for all amounts 
to threatening with an unloaded gun. Only a slow process of  rejections and 
tough bargaining will, according to this argument, instill the right discipline. 
In general, the problem has been tackled through a gradual institutional and 
political bargaining process. In Hungary, for example, the government recently 
guaranteed 50 percent (Ft 10 billion) of the bad debts inherited by the banks 
from  the  previous  regime.  The remaining  bad  debt that  has  accumulated, 
mainly as a result of the CMEA collapse, will be provisioned by the banks over 
a three-year period, with the implicit understanding that it will be deducted 
from the annual profits for tax purposes (this implies an implicit participation 
21, This procedure was followed in Israel in recent major debt-rescheduling schemes for the 
Histadrut-owned (trade union federation) industrial conglomerate (Koor) and in the settlements 
belonging to the Kibbutz movement. Both groups were in severe financial straits in the aftermath 
of the 1985 stabilization programs. The Kibbutz movement’s cumulative debt had reached some 
15 percent of total GDP before the financial restructuring plan was implemented. In another group, 
the Moshav (cooperative) movement, an earlier scheme had to be shelved because of noncompli- 
ance and political pressure, and a new one has yet to be instituted. 44  Michael Bruno 
of the state budget of 40 percent). This solution is politically attractive because 
it reduces the apparent profits of the banks (which have recently been exorbi- 
tant, given the large interest rate margins) while appearing to conceal the im- 
plicit cost to the budget. In Czechoslovakia, the government decided to allow 
the National Property Funds, the recipients of the proceeds from privatization, 
to issue KEs 50 billion in bonds to be used to write off old enterprise debt 
and to provide a direct capital injection to the banks. This solution actually 
seems to be working (see below), especially since Czechoslovalua’s internal 
debt is small. It remains to be seen whether Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria can 
also introduce a bank provisioning and tax participation scheme similar to the 
one adopted in Hungary. 
Another major problem is how  to prevent enterprises from continuing to 
borrow to survive rather than adjusting. Recapitalizing the banks and letting 
them handle the problem would seem to be the best policy, provided that the 
banks are equipped to make the proper economic analysis and are able to take 
into account the interests of  the bond issuers, namely, the government or the 
taxpayers (who implicitly cover the tax losses). Unfortunately, the financial 
interests of commercial banks and the long-run economic viability of the enter- 
prise do not  necessarily  coincide; ideally, the  existing owner of  the asset, 
namely, the state, should participate in the process. This is part of  the more 
general problem of enterprise control in the transition period (see the next sec- 
tion) and is further compounded by the fact that the commercial banking sys- 
tem itself is not yet financially independent of the central bank, leaving part of 
the quasi-fiscal deficit open ended. 
How  should the public financing of  bank capitalization and enterprise re- 
structuring be treated? If  this type of public expenditure takes the form of a 
once-and-for-all stock adjustment, it should not be reckoned as part of  the 
regular tax-financed budget. Rather, it should be included as part of the priva- 
tization accounts (as is done by the Treuhandanstalt in East Germany or, im- 
plicitly, in the recent Czechoslovak financial injection). Even if there is an ini- 
tial net debt position, it could be financed by the issue of domestic bonds and/ 
or external financial aid. Alternatively, it could be included in a broader capital 
account budget from which infrastructure investment could also be financed. 
To be credible, a one-time stock adjustment should not be perceived as a per- 
manent rise in the money and credit growth rates. 
Finally, it is essential that enterprises are given the right signal-that  finan- 
cial rescheduling is a one-time conditional act, not a precedent. 
1.7  Privatization of Large State-Owned Enterprises-What  to Do 
during the (Long) Transition? 
In all five East European countries, the privatization of (mainly small-scale) 
trade and services enterprises has moved briskly, but it is at a virtual standstill 
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for the delay have been legal (restitution problems in Czechoslovakia),  political 
(bad experiences with instant privatization in Hungary and Poland), or practi- 
cal (lack of  foreign or domestic investors). Even with the advanced voucher 
scheme being implemented in Czechoslovakia, it is not yet clear how a new, 
workable corporate control will emerge. It is clear that in all countries there 
will be a prolonged interim period during which the state will continue to own 
a considerable portion of the enterprise sector. 
In privatization, as in loan cleanups, extreme solutions (completely discard 
or continue to embrace the past regime) are not workable and certainly not the 
optimal solution. The problem is how  to instill market-oriented behavior in 
management and workers without unduly delaying the privatization stage. It 
appears that this problem has not been systematically addressed in any of the 
countries. 
In Hungary, an attempt has been made to learn from the failure of the previ- 
ous government’s “spontaneous privatization” episode. The new Law on Eco- 
nomic Transformation moves the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) out of  the 
jurisdiction of  enterprise councils and gives them company status, under the 
aegis of  the State Property Agency (SPA). In the transition period, the state 
becomes the legal owner as audited balance sheets and a board of directors are 
introduced. Supervision of management is partly subcontracted to approved 
advisory agencies, which become the agents of the SPA. 
Much  of  the  Hungarian  privatization  has  taken  the  form  of  “self- 
privatization,” whereby a manager looks for potential buyers, who then must 
be approved by the SPA or its accredited consulting firms. The process is obvi- 
ously a slow one. The Czechoslovak government, in contrast, seems to have 
opted for speedy privatization since only the new owners will be in a position 
to do what is good for the firm. As a result, no systematic thought has been 
given to how the enterprises in the so-called no-man’s land are to be controlled. 
Although the view is understandable, ignoring the problem does not help since 
pressure is mounting for subsidies or cheap credit for enterprises in depressed 
regions. 
Giving in to these pressures could result in SOEs staying in state hands for- 
ever. Unfortunately, there seems to be no escape from these halfway policies, 
unless the authorities are willing to take the line that what cannot be privatized 
instantaneously had better be scrapped. This option, however, makes little eco- 
nomic sense from a medium-run point of view since a sizable amount of indus- 
trial product may  be made marketable after marginal investments have been 
made  in  physical  and/or human  capital, especially on  the  marketing side. 
Moreover, because of  the huge potential unemployment problem (with em- 
ployment in SOEs anywhere between 30 and 50 percent of  the labor force), 
wholesale scrapping is not very likely to be feasible. 
In Poland, commercialization as an intermediate step was envisaged as im- 
portant since it was more likely to free managers from the control of the work- 
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of firms. Such compensation could be given, at least in part, by long-maturity 
stock options or by including a longer-tern profit share in the manager’s con- 
tract. A compelling alternative argument, at least for the Polish case (see Da- 
browski, Federowicz, and Levitas 1991), is that the power of  the workers’ 
councils is too important a legacy from the Communist regime to be easily 
dissipated. According to this view, the only way to resolve the political stale- 
mate between the workers’ councils and the state is mass privatization through 
giveaway schemes in which the present stakeholders in the enterprise, namely, 
the workers’ councils and the managers, will be the major beneficiaries. This 
would be a form of controlled spontaneous privatization. 
The variety of experience across countries suggests that there may not be 
one best way  of  resolving the privatization issue and that each country must 
choose the one that best fits its political and social framework. But, no matter 
which strategy each country adopts, it is important that it be transparent, send- 
ing clear signals to investors, managers, and workers, so as to minimize uncer- 
tainty in the transition period. Also, policy framers must not forget that macro- 
economic policies alone can achieve only so much and that micro management 
policies should be integrated into the general policy framework right from the 
start as well as throughout the program. Privatization is one part of the reform 
process where the integration of macro and micro policy is essential. 
1.8  Concluding Remarks 
This discussion of the recent East European experience with stabilization 
points to broad common denominators in the five countries considered here as 
well as with countries elsewhere. The sharp stabilization approach applies 
more or less generally, while any differences across countries originate in the 
varying ability to control the budget or the amount of  credit or wage policy 
rather than  in  the underlying conceptual macroeconomic framework.  The 
greatest differences across countries are also the micro foundations of  each 
economy, such as in  ownership rights and financial accountability-which 
have also proved most resistant to change. The general lesson to be learned 
here is that, from the start, the policy reform package has to put even greater 
emphasis on implementation of  the institutions and rules of behavior for the 
micro units. Otherwise, the stabilization part of the reform could unravel. 
Another related issue is the perceived role of  government in the transition 
from a centrally planned to a market economy. In the old days, communism 
was often viewed from the outside in highly simplified terms-a  minutely de- 
tailed central plan and an omnipotent government. Likewise, today, capitalism 
is viewed simplistically by those who would like to embrace it as a well-oiled 
system consisting only of  private property ownership and pure laissez-faire 
and self-adjusting market mechanisms, requiring no government interference. 
However, market failures often occur in the most laissez-faire economies (e.g., 
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Thus, a hands-off policy during the transition from a centrally planned to a 
market economy would be most inappropriate. The temptation to resort to the 
old mistakes under central planning may be strong-for  example, in the pro- 
cess of restructuring-but  that possibility should not be used as an argument 
against any government intervention during the transition period. If the neces- 
sity for intervention is not acknowledged and guidelines regulating its applica- 
tion and defining its purpose are not established, there will be intervention 
in practice anyway, but, without an overall view of  its scope, direction, and 
implications, intervention will be haphazard and could involve costs that would 
breach budget constraints and threaten macroeconomic stability. 
This discussion has concentrated mainly on issues common to the five East 
European countries during the past two years. As time passes, the differences 
among these countries are likely to become more important from a policy per- 
spective, as has usually been the experience of other countries undergoing sta- 
bilization and structural reform. 
One issue on which economists cannot be of much help is the internal poli- 
tics of reform. The external observer is struck by the apparent universal accep- 
tance of the drastic changes that have taken place so far, despite the sharp real 
wage cuts, the fall in living standards, and the rise in unemployment. Although 
it can be reasonably argued that the official statistics do not really capture 
reality because of statistical biases, incorrect coverage, and so on, it is also true 
that numbers, even if inaccurate, are used in the political marketplace (e.g., the 
consumer price index is used in the wage bargaining process, whether formally 
or informally). Some recent attempted strikes in Czechoslovakia ran into pub- 
lic opposition, and the policy stance of  the government appears to be well 
understood by  the public at large. The government in Bulgaria, with all its 
difficulties, apparently seems to have  public support. In Hungary, however, 
there seemed to be a contrast between the apparent success of macro policies 
and the public’s negative perception of  them, as if  the government has been 
unsuccessful in selling its policy product. 
The experience with reforms both elsewhere and across countries in Eastern 
Europe points to the paramount importance of  policymakers being able not 
only to spell out government strategies in detail and in terms that can be widely 
understood but also to sell their product to the public. The impending internal 
social problems in all the countries will no doubt put all the reform efforts to 
a serious test, as political democratization proceeds and the possibility of bliss 
recedes. The social element is no doubt the biggest imponderable in each of 
the countries: what, if anything, can ensure the maintenance of the social con- 
sensus over the period of the reform program and its political sustainability in 
the near future? As one observer has asked, “Are they, in return for true free- 
dom, prepared to give up bread lines for unemployment lines?”22  The 1991-92 
22. The quote, attributed to Susan Marie Szasz, appears in Klaus (1991). 48  Michael Bruno 
postelection developments in Poland and the separatist movement in Czecho- 
slovakia do not bode well, but in this area, as with many others surveyed in 
this paper, it is probably much too early to tell. 
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